Some thoughts on the abortion debate

Something that's always bothered me about the abortion debate is that it's not much of a debate--at least in the most proper sense of the word. A debate, as I understand it, is a discussion aimed ultimately at the attainment of truth. Thus, in such a debate both sides will try to refute the other's argument. But in the abortion debate, this doesn't really happen.

As I just mentioned, debate ought to be ordered to truth. But attaining the truth requires two things: (1) correct principles and (2) valid and sound reasoning. Hence, in a debate or discussion aimed at truth, part of the exchange will involve the two sides attempting to either show the falsity of the other's principles, or the invalidity of the other's reasoning. If one is able to do either or both of these things successfully, that is called a refutation, the necessary result of which is to show that the other's conclusion is false (or at least that it doesn't follow from its premises), which is the aim of a refutation.

But this doesn't happen in the abortion debate. Consider the following argument:

(1) Murder is wrong.
(2) Abortion is murder.
(3) Therefore, abortion is wrong.

This is commonly considered the main argument of the "pro-life" side of the abortion debate. Now, according to what we said above, to refute this argument, one would have to do one of two things: (1) show that the premises are false or (2) show that the argument does not validly arrive at its conclusion. The argument itself is valid and the conclusion follows from the premises--that is, there is no fault in its reasoning (I cannot go into why, however. To do so would take me beyond the scope of this post). To refute this argument, therefore, one must show that one of the premises is false; that is, one must show either that (a) murder is not wrong or that (b) abortion is not murder. Now, I don't think our society has yet reached such moral depravity that it would dare try to show that murder is not wrong, i.e. that the first premise is false. I pray that day never comes. Nevertheless, what the pro-choice advocate must do is to try to show that abortion is not murder, i.e. that the second premise is false, in order to refute this argument.

Now, doubtless, pro-choicers often try to do just this. However, they also, perhaps just as often, don't. The pro-choice argument typically goes something like this:

(1) Everyone has a right to choose what to do with what belongs to oneself.
(2) One's body belongs to oneself.
(3) Therefore, everyone has a right to choose what to do with one's body.

(4) It is wrong to take away one's rights.
(5) Everyone has a right to choose what to do with one's body.
(6) Therefore, it is wrong to take away one's right to choose what to do with one's body.

(7) It is wrong to take away one's right to choose what to do with one's body.
(8) Making abortion illegal takes away one's right to choose what to do with one's body.
(9) Therefore, making abortion illegal is wrong.

(One may notice that this argument is far less straightforward than the pro-life argument, which one can tell from the fact that it is three times as long. In my view, this is indicative of how one must stretch one's mind to accept the pro-choice argument, which itself is indicative of its discord with the intellect. But I digress.) Now, remember, as established above, to refute the pro-life argument, one must show that abortion is not murder. But in the pro-choice argument just presented, there is no mention of murder anywhere. It simply does not address it. Hence, it does not, strictly speaking, refute the pro-life argument. But so too, the pro-life argument does not, strictly speaking, refute the pro-choice argument.

In fact, the two arguments hardly even have anything to do with each other besides the fact that they both mention abortion. One can see this in their respective conclusions: one concludes that "Abortion is wrong," the other concludes that "Making abortion illegal is wrong." One is concerned with the morality of abortion, the other is concerned with the legality of abortion. "Abortion should be legal" is not, logically speaking, the direct opposite of "Abortion is wrong," which is what the pro-choice argument would have had to show to refute the pro-life argument. The same follows vice versa.

Hence, the point I want to make is this: neither the pro-life argument nor the pro-choice argument directly addresses the other. If a "pro-lifer" were to ask a "pro-choicer," "Is abortion murder?" and the pro-choicer were to answer, "A woman's body ought to be subject to her choice," the pro-choicer would not have answered the question. Similarly, if the pro-choicer were to ask the pro-lifer, "Should a woman's body be subject to the choice of the woman?" and the pro-lifer were to answer, "Abortion is murder," the pro-lifer would not have answered the question. Both questions simply require a "Yes" or "No" answer. Neither answer is a "Yes" or a "No." One can simply see this problem in the very names of the positions: one side is pro-life; one would expect its opposite to be called anti-life or pro-death. But instead, the other side is called pro-choice. The same can be said mutatis mutandis for the pro-choice position. This all seems to indicate that neither side is really talking about the same thing.

Consequently, if we are concerned about the truth of abortion, the current debate is not properly ordered. Both sides are concerned with two different things, only incidentally related to each other, if that. What we must do, rather, is first establish which concern is more important: that is, is it more important to figure out whether abortion is murder, or to figure out whether abortion takes away a woman's right to choose what to do with her body? (For what it's worth, I think any sensible person should see the that the former is more pressing.)

To be clear, I think many have become more aware of this problem. Hence, I've heard pro-choice advocates argue that being "pro-choice" does not mean being "anti-life" or "pro-death." But then they often fail to sufficiently explain why. Nevertheless, on the whole, the difficulty I'm trying to point out still seems quite prevalent.

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This phenomenon happens in nearly every debate in American politics. But that, perhaps, shows the reason for it all, namely, that these are political debates. As I mentioned in the beginning of this post, the most proper sense of the term "debate" is a discussion ordered towards truth. Hence, such debates are speculative in character, and thus, the considerations above only apply to such debates. But the abortion debate is not a speculative one--it is not, strictly speaking, aimed at finding the truth. Rather, it is a practical debate since politics is a practical matter--it is aimed at finding out what ought to be done. Hence, it deals with human actions. But human actions get easily caught up in particulars and so are highly variable. Hence, figuring out what ought to be done is often a messy affair. (Of course, figuring out the truth of things can often be messy in its own way too. But not in the same way that politics is messy.)

To be sure, politics and practical matters have something to do with truth, especially insofar as politics deals with moral matters since human actions are always aimed at the human good, and anything dealing with the human good is a moral matter; and the human good is objective and so a matter of truth. But since politics also has an essential practical element, political debates need not always follow a strictly logical form wherein each side attempts to logically refute the other. That would only be the case if the principal concern in politics was finding out the truth of things.

But in politics, one finds oneself concerned with all sorts of things other than simply truth. For instance, because the American political regime is structured in such a way that politicians must often get the approval of certain others in order to accomplish what they wish to accomplish, much of what they have to do includes persuading others, which tends to require presenting oneself well to others. Hence, for example, I have heard a political commentator note how a politician can look weak when he attempts to "defend" his position or answer objections to his policies. Rather, it tends to be in his interest to "attack" the position of his political opponents because it makes him look "stronger." For how one looks in the public eye is more important in politics than in philosophy, whose sole concern is finding truth. In philosophy, defending one's position against objections does not make one look weak at all--quite the contrary. But in philosophy, no one cares "how one looks." There, it's all about attaining truth. In philosophy, that is all that matters.

Not so in politics. Hence, it is not all that surprising that political debates often end up with both sides talking past each other, as we see in the abortion debate.